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Insight
Resilience: Accounting for the Noncomputable
Stephen R. Carpenter 1, Carl Folke 2,3, Marten Scheffer 4, and Frances Westley 5
ABSTRACT. Plans to solve complex environmental problems should always consider the role of surprise.
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to emphasize known computable aspects of a problem while neglecting
aspects that are unknown and failing to ask questions about them. The tendency to ignore the noncomputable
can be countered by considering a wide range of perspectives, encouraging transparency with regard to
conflicting viewpoints, stimulating a diversity of models, and managing for the emergence of new syntheses
that reorganize fragmentary knowledge.
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INTRODUCTION
Although science has made enormous progress by
framing problems in tractable ways, the same focus
that produces excellence in science may prove
shortsighted in solving complex environmental
problems. Depletion of stratospheric ozone above
the South Pole began in the 1970s but remained
undetected for years because the computer
programs that analyzed satellite data were instructed
to reject measurements that deviated from
expectations. The anomaly was seen to be real only
when ground-based observations of rising UV-B
radiation triggered a reanalysis. By the time the cod
fishery of Newfoundland was finally closed in 1992,
fishermen and some scientists had been aware of
the impending collapse for years. The public and
decision makers did not perceive the full picture for
many reasons, including incentives for fishers to
under-report bycatch and institutional practices that
selectively filtered the evidence. Even open,
transparent interdisciplinary assessment processes
such as those of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change have difficulties presenting the full
range of possible climate trajectories because
models are not available for all of the mechanisms
(Oppenheimer et al. 2007).
In all of these cases, unknown threats are masked
by assumptions that frame the questions that are
asked. The full complexity of the situation is not
perceived because of two filters that constrain points
of view:
 
l
 First, there is a tendency to focus on the
computable, despite our awareness of other
noncomputable aspects of complex problems.
 
l
 Second, there is a tendency to believe in
dominant models even though they are
incomplete, and this belief may be strong
enough to filter out signals that are
inconsistent with the dominant model.
 Thus, shortsightedness prevents us from seeing
problems on the horizon. The obvious solution is to
take varied signals from diverse thinkers seriously,
even if they strike us as strange and irrelevant. This
seems at odds with the need to have the best
specialists lead the way in crucial issues.
Nevertheless, the consideration of a wide range of
perspectives is a hallmark of resilient decision
making in the face of unexpected change.
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WHAT WE DON’T KNOW
The social upheavals, natural disasters, and
technological breakthroughs that have shaped the
past and present could not be anticipated in their
time. That is one reason why they stand out. There
are several reasons why surprise (Gunderson 2003)
will always happen:
 
l
 First, statistical extrapolation of the past may
create a bias. At best, forecasts of massive
events will be extrapolations from a few
analogous experiences or based on a
mechanistic model of processes that are
thought to lead to the event. Such predictions
are highly uncertain. At worst, an event will
be completely unknown from past experience
and will come as a bolt out of the blue.
 
l
 Second, in the absence of reliable models for
mechanisms that can generate extreme
events, such as the Greenland icecap sliding
into the ocean, mechanisms of this type are
simply left out (Oppenheimer et al. 2007).
 
l
 A third cause is that we routinely fail to ask
the questions that would prepare us even for
the anticipation of big, important change. We
simply don’t know what we don’t know.
 The unpredictability of extreme events may often
be overlooked, because any given event is easily
interpreted in hindsight. However, each extreme
event is complex, affecting physical, ecological,
economic, cultural, and social systems simultaneously.
Although experts in some areas might predict some
of these impacts, the sheer scale of a massive
environmental change is the result of multiple
interacting factors that no one anticipates. Who
would have predicted that a global loss of liquidity
would coincide with a fast rise in oil prices, which
in turn raised food prices, as well as a boom in the
demand for grain biofuel that put rich-world energy
in direct competition with poor-world food? Each
individual shock might have been on the radar
screens of some of the people in an individual sector,
but no one would have predicted the coincident
crises in finance, energy, and food and the
confluence of shocks. Because they are not easily
computable, many important aspects do not find
their way into the models that dominate policy
decisions. Instead, the dominant models are a
patchwork of rigorous but fragmented information
(Fig. 1A).
THE PROBLEM OF DOMINANT MODELS
Narrow world views and incomplete models may
exclude crucial information even if it is available.
Hurricane Katrina, which hit New Orleans in 2005,
caused approximately U.S. $125 billion in damages.
Odds makers had put the probability of an event of
this magnitude at 1–2.5%, and insurance companies
had estimated the potential damage at U.S. $10–26
billion. The dominance of this view meant that no
one was prepared. There were those who predicted
the disaster more accurately, but their views were
disregarded. Dominant models are often linked to
hierarchy. The annals of medicine are replete with
accidents that occur because the protocol of
medicine privileges the decisions of doctors, often
linked to the dominant paradigm of treatment, over
the contradictory views of nurses, therapists,
patients, and their families (Gawande 2002). The
stronger the dominant view, and the more
completely it dominates, the greater the myopia of
what could otherwise be a broad problem-solving
team.
In contrast, there are examples of scientific
assessments of complex environmental situations
that engaged diverse viewpoints and resulted in
breakthroughs. In Madagascar, information
provided by illiterate village hunters and loggers
proved crucial for solving the scientific puzzle of
the precipitous decline of the giant jumping rat and
prompted new approaches to managing the species
(CBSG 2002). Similarly, the inclusion of the
viewpoints and knowledge of indigenous fishermen
in the assessment of the endangered bumphead
parrotfish provided breakthroughs that allowed for
successful management (Aswani and Hamilton
2004). Although efforts like the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (2005) brought in diverse
knowledge systems and community-based experiences
of ecosystem management along with scientific
assessment, such examples are still the exception to
the rule.
BALANCING DIVERSITY AND
EXCELLENCE
Although the benefits of a diversity of viewpoints
seem obvious, there are good explanations for why
diversity is so often lacking. The payoffs from
efficiency, rationality, and standardization have
resulted in an emphasis on “best practice” and a
tendency toward monoculture or the dominance of
the few (Frank and Cook 1995). Dominance of the
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Fig. 1. (A) Excellent disciplinary work can lead to precise pictures of parts of the whole. (B) A
generalist perspective can encompass the whole, but precision may be low and uncertainty may increase
temporarily.
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few also affects the nature of progress in science
and the use of science in decision making. The
multiple filters required to establish scientific
credibility and leadership create a hierarchy in
which increasing dominance is exerted by nodes in
which influence and citations concentrate (Newman
2004). Such repeated demands for decision making
from a few increase efficiency but also reduce the
diversity of potential responses.
The inclusion of diverse viewpoints should not lead
to the replacement of the fragmented views of
specialists by vague generalities (Fig. 1B). Rather,
we need to become more effective at filling in the
gaps in our incomplete world view while
maintaining the high quality of the pieces we know.
Ironically, this may require reducing the role of “the
best.” Perhaps counterintuitively, complex problems,
i.e., problems with many solutions that are quite
different in execution and rankable in quality of
outcome, may be solved better by a diverse team of
competent individuals than by a team composed of
the best individual problem solvers (Page 2007).
Nonetheless, the tendency in science policy is to
turn repeatedly to the best of the best even in
situations of high complexity. The problem of
dominant models implies that merely involving a
wider group of advisers is not enough, because the
diversity of viewpoints that might be the best tool
for addressing uncertainty may easily be suppressed
in the interests of achieving consensus
(Oppenheimer et al. 2007).
Despite such difficulties, the tendency toward
fragmentation can be countered without losing the
value of expertise. To expand the diversity of
models, it is helpful to increase the diversity of
problem solvers on the team in terms of disciplinary
background, methodology, conflict and learning
styles, age cohort, gender, and cultural background,
and also to use processes that stimulate a wide range
of models and allow for transparency with regard
to conflicting viewpoints. Scenarios or stories that
evolve through structured conversation about
change are a process for organizing diverse
viewpoints of the future (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 2005). Other approaches developed
specifically to stimulate the diversity of models and
the emergence of novel responses to complex
problems consider a wide range of world views,
expand the set of questions being asked, and thereby
expand the set of models and options under
consideration (White 2000). Such processes
manage for emergence (Westley and Miller 2003).
The ultimate goal of a balanced confrontation of
viewpoints is to reorganize our fragmentary
knowledge and see a comprehensive sharp picture
emerge (Fig. 2). The integrated synthetic picture
may appear radical, unrealistic, and surprising from
any particular perspective, but embraces the
diversity of what we know about the problem and
prompts vital questions about what we don’t know
that we don’t know.
RESILIENCE FOR ADAPTATION AND
TRANSFORMATION
Massive transitions have shaped the world.
Disappearances of ancient urbanized societies were
followed by intervals from which few artifacts
remain to reveal human culture. The vegetation that
we see now may reflect past volcanic eruptions,
hurricanes, insect outbreaks, or mega El Niño
events. Similarly, scientific thinking today reflects
a legacy of incidental big changes in the past
associated with groundbreaking insights by Galileo,
Newton, Darwin, and others.
Unpredicted transitions will shape the future and
may even become more common. Ecosystems and
the services they provide to people are changing
more than at any time in recorded history, and many
drivers are intensifying (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 2005). These trends may lead to more
frequent, intense, and interconnected extreme
events. Although environmental extreme events are
now sometimes included in risk assessments (World
Economic Forum 2007), we usually lack the
information necessary to estimate the probabilities
of the important ones and their cascading effects.
The prospect that accelerating environmental
change may increase the frequency, severity, and
interconnectedness of such events raises the
urgency of building resilience to address future
large impacts on ecosystems and people.
If we fail, environmental problem solving will look
very much like it does now: scientists working in
their labs, managers working in agencies in which
logics of action override logics of analysis, policy
makers working in a political context in which
knowledge is useful only if it is power. If we
succeed, we will ask the excluded questions that
must be asked to build resilience to unfolding
environmental problems and a capacity to transform
social-ecological systems as circumstances change.
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Fig. 2. The challenge of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives is to retain the precision of diverse
elements of the whole to create an overarching picture. The results may seem strange, unrealistic, and
surprising, but they allow for novel approaches and new questions to arise. The painting is Nature Morte
Vivante (Still Life Moving Fast) by Salvador Dali, 1956, 125x160 cm. The original is in the Salvador
Dali Museum, St. Petersburg, Florida, USA.
 Nature Morte Vivante (Still Life - Fast Moving)
(1956) Oil on canvas
49 1/4 x 63 inches
© Salvador Dalí. Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí, (Artist Rights Society), 2006
Collection of the Salvador Dalí Museum, Inc., St. Petersburg, FL, 2006.
Reproduction, including downloading of Dali works is prohibited by copyright laws and internation
conventions without the express written permission of Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York.
In this new approach to science, teams approaching
complex scientific problems would from the
beginning comprise diverse perspectives, including
various experts, practitioners, and citizens, all
equipped with the skills needed and an
understanding of how to work together as a team.
The process is one of uncovering, not masking, the
heightened uncertainty created by engaging
multiple perspectives to interpret and act in a
complex world. The outcome is the resilience
needed to create the future.
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Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss1/art13/
responses/
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